Rico Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegtimate Enterprises by Neuenschwander, Jan
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 72
Issue 4 Winter Article 14
Winter 1981
Rico Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegtimate
Enterprises
Jan Neuenschwander
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Jan Neuenschwander, Rico Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegtimate Enterprises, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1426 (1981)
0091-4169/81/7204-1426
THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW &CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 72, No. 4
Copyright © 1981 by Northwestern University School of Law Pintedi U.SA.
RICO EXTENDED TO APPLY TO
WHOLLY ILLEGITIMATE
ENTERPRISES
United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Turkette,I the Supreme Court resolved the conflict
over the scope of the term "enterprise" in the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The high Court agreed with
the majority of the courts of appeals that the RICO proscriptions should
not be confined to legitimate businesses, but rather should be read
broadly to extend even to wholly illegitimate enterprises. 2 The Court
also narrowed the applicability of RICO by requiring that the existence
of an "enterprise" be proved by evidence of an "ongoing organization"
whose "various associates function as a continuing unit."'3
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute,4
known commonly as RICO, was enacted as Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.5 The substantive provisions of RICO are in
section 1962. Sections 1962(a) and (b) prohibit the use of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" or the income received from such activity to ac-
quire an interest in or control of "any enterprise" affecting interstate
commerce. 6 Section 1962(c) provides:
1 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
2 Courts and commentators have used the word "legitimate" in discussions of RICO to
refer to enterprises that engage in some legal business activities. The Supreme Court holding
in United States v. Turkette extends the RICO "enterprise" to "wholly illegitimate" enter-
prises, that is, to organizations that engage solely in criminal activity. Id at 2527. Neverthe-
less, confusion as to what organization should be considered the "enterprise" in a given RICO
prosecution renders the distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises un-
clear. See note 46 infra.
3 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976).
5 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. . . . (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate subsections (a),
(b), or (c).7 RICO provides for both criminal and civil penalties.8 The
criminal penalties are severe, allowing forfeiture of interests acquired in
enterprises in violation of section 1962, fines of $25,000, and imprison-
ment for twenty years. 9 The civil remedies provided in section 1964 are
modeled after those which have proven effective in antitrust prosecu-
tions.10 These remedies include injunction, divestiture, dissolution and
reorganization."' Treble damages are available to any person whose
property or business has been injured as a result of a section 1962
violation. 12
An "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union orgroup of individuals asso-
ciatedinfact although not a legal entity."' 3 Section 1961(1) lists specific
state and federal crimes which constitute "racketeering activity" for
prosecution under RICO. 14 Commission of two acts of "racketeering
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsec-
tions (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (1976).
9 d at § 1963.
10 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969); 116 CONG. REC. 591, 602 (1970).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
12 Id at § 1964(c).
13 Id at § 1961(4) (emphasis added). The description "associated in fact" is at the center
of the controversy over the scope of "enterprise" in RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette,
101 S. Ct. at 2526, 2527; United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 905 (1st Cir. 1980).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) provides:
'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), § 224 (relating to sports bribery),
§§ 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), § 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under § 659 is felonious, § 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), §§ 891-894 (relating to -extortionate credit transac-
tions), § 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), § 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), § 1343 (relating to wire fraud), § 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
§ 1510 (relating to the obstruction of criminal investigations), § 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), § 1951 (relating to interference with com-
merce, robbery, or extortion), § 1952 (relating to racketeering), § 1953 (relating to inter-
state transportation of wagering paraphernalia), § 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), § 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),
§§ 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), §§ 2341-46
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activity" within ten years establishes a "pattern of racketeering
activity. '1 5
II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF TURKETTE
The issue in Turkette was whether a group whose members engaged
solely in criminal activity constituted an "enterprise" within the scope of
RICO section 1962.16 The indictment alleged that Turkette was the
central figure in an "enterprise," which the indictment described as:
a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally traffick-
ing in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing
the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and at-
tempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and at-
tempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court
proceedings .... 17
The indictment charged Turkette and his twelve associates with conspir-
ing to conduct or participate in the affairs of an "enterprise" affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 The
activities of the "enterprise"' 9 constituted a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" since they included at least two state and federal crimes listed in
RICO section 1961.20 Turkette was convicted by a jury, sentenced to a
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), §§ 2421-24 (relating to white slave traf-
fic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, § 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or § 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud
in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, conceal-
ment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punish-
able under any law of the United States .. "
15 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5): "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity. .. .
16 101 S. Ct. at 2526.
17 Indictment at 15. (The indictment is contained in the Joint Appendix following the
Brief for the Petitioner). The RICO conspiracy count was the last count of a nine-count
indictment and charged Turkette and his twelve associates. Id at 14-15. Seven of the defend-
ants pleaded guilty before trial. Of the six remaining defendants, the district court convicted
only Turkette on the RICO count. Although the district court dismissed the RICO count
against defendant Vargas, it refused his motion for severance, and he was convicted on one of
the other counts. The appeal to the First Circuit involved both Turkette and Vargas. United
States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 896.
18 The participation in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) which makes it unlawful to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See note 7supra.
19 The activities included in the indictment are listed in the text accompanying note 17
.uprna.
20 Indictment at 15-16. The indictment charged the defendants with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (relating to the unlawful distribution of
controlled substances), and several sections of the Massachusetts General Laws. Id
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twenty-year term and fined $20,000 for the RICO count.21
On appeal, Turkette argued that because the sole purpose of RICO
was to protect legitimate enterprises from infiltration by organized
crime,22 RICO did not extend to the illegal activities of Turkette and his
associates. 23 After examining the language and structure of RICO and
the statute's legislative history,24 the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit concluded that RICO limited "enterprise" to legitimate organiza-
tions.25 Since Turkette and his associates were not connected with any
legitimate "enterprise," the First Circuit held that RICO was inapplica-
ble.26 The court of appeals reversed Turkette's conviction and re-
manded the case for a new trial.2 7
This narrow interpretation of "enterprise" by the First Circuit was
contrary to the position adopted by every other circuit which had ad-
dressed the issue.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari29 in order to
resolve the conflict over the scope of the term "enterprise" in RICO.30
The Court examined the language of the statute and concluded,
contrary to the findings of the First Circuit, that "neither the language
nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate 'enter-
prises.' "31 The Court also examined the legislative history of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 as a whole and Title IX in
21 101 S. Ct. at 2527. The jury also found Turkette guilty on the other eight counts con-
tained in the indictment. Id Turkette's sentence on the RICO conviction was to run concur-
rently with his twenty-year sentence for the other counts. Id
22 Set notes 80 and 83 & accompanying text infia.
23 632 F.2d at 898. Courts that limited RICO to legitimate enterprises required that the
enterprise be a legitimate business organization or individuals connected with such an organi-
zation. See notes 37-38 infla.
24 632 F.2d at 898-903.
25 Id at 901, 905-06. The First Circuit also held in Turketle that the joinder of Turkette
and Vargas was impermissible because it violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) which requires joint
defendants "to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense or offenses." 632 F.2d at 906. The Supreme Court did
not address the joinder issue. The Court's definition of "enterprise" would appear to make
such joinder permissible. See 101 S. Ct. at 2528 and note 47 & accompanying text infra.
26 632 F.2d at 906.
27 Id at 910.
28 See United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 269 (1980); United States v. White-
head, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied,445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977). The Eighth Circuit had not addressed this issue directly. See note 39 infia. The First
Circuit noted in United States v. Turkette that its decision was opposed to the majority view.
29 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981).
30 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2526.
3' Id at 2530.
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particular. 32 Unlike the First Circuit, the Supreme Court could find no
basis for concluding that Title IX did not extend to "enterprises organ-
ized and existing for criminal purposes. ' 33 The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals. Justice White, writing for the
eight justice majority, held that RICO is equally applicable to legiti-
mate enterprises and to criminal enterprises which engage in no legiti-
mate activities.3 4 Justice Stewart dissented, stating that he agreed "with
the reasoning and conclusion of the Court of Appeals as to the meaning
of the term 'enterprise.' -35
III. TURKETTE AND PRIOR CASE LAW: DISPUTE OVER THE
INCLUSION OF WHOLLY ILLEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES
The Supreme Court's decision in Trkette confirmed the majority
view, adopted by eight circuits, 36 that the term "enterprise" in RICO
encompassed illegitimate enterprises. In four of these circuits, however,
there had been strong dissents arguing that "enterprise" should be inter-
preted narrowly so as to exclude illegitimate organizations. 3 7 The Sixth
Circuit had only recently adopted the broad interpretation when it re-
versed en banc a decision by a three-judge panel. 38 Commentators were
fairly evenly divided over the issue. 39 The position of the Eighth Circuit
32 Id at 2530-34.
33 Id at 2532.
34 Id at 2533-34.
35 Id at 2534.
36 See note 28 supra.
37 See United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d at 1042 (Merritt, J., dissenting); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d at 311 (Swygert, J., dissenting); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682,
690 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d at 573 (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
38 A three-judge panel had held in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir.
1979), that "enterprise" must be confined to individuals "organized and acting for some os-
tensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared or informally recognized." Id The Sixth
Circuit, en banc, rejected the narrow interpretation: "the statute itself makes it plain that
Congress intended to bring the full force of federal law enforcement into the effort to destroy
organized crime and that it had no intention of limiting the federal effort to just those 'osten-
sibly legitimate' enterprises which organized crime might use." 642 F.2d at 1003. Since the
Sixth Circuit found no ambiguity in the statute, it concluded that the statute must be inter-
preted by courts as written. Id
39 Commentators agreeing that "enterprise" includes illegitimate organizations include:
Atkinson, "Racketeer Inenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 US. C §§ 1961-68 Broadest of the
Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1 (1978); Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront:"
RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REV. 837 (1980); Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980); Note, The Enterprise Element in RICO. A
Proposed Interpretation, 49 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 123 (1980); Note, The Racketeer Infalenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act: Proscription ofIllegiimate and Criminal Enterprises , 10 MEM. ST. L. REV.
633 (1980); Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative Histoqy Rather than the Statute
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on the applicability of RICO to illegitimate enterprises was unclear.40
The points of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Turkette mirror the dispute among
judges in other circuits and among commentators.
One objection to the broad interpretation of "enterprise" in RICO
has been that if wholly illegitimate organizations qualified as "enter-
prises," the "enterprise" element would be eliminated from the statute.4 1
Proof of two acts of racketeering would establish both the "pattern" and
the existence of an "enterprise," making RICO merely a proscription
against "patterns of racketeering activity.142 The First Circuit offered
this argument in support of its narrow interpretation of "enterprise" in
Turkette.43  This objection to the inclusion of illegitimate enterprises
within the scope of RICO confuses the elements necessary to establish a
RICO violation. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Trkette, to se-
cure a conviction under RICO, the government must establish both the
existence of an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeering activity" con-
Itself', 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 777 (1980). Commentators favoring the narrow interpretation
include: Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutors Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165
(1980); Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analsis of Issues Arisingin its Interpretation, 27 DEPAuL L. REv. 89 (1977); Comment, United States v. Sutton and the Scope
of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 The Sixth Circuit's Narrow Interpretation of the
Aeaning of"Enterprise", 68 Ky. L. J. 469 (1979-80); Comment, Organized Crine and the Infiltration
of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 192 (1975);
Note, United States v. Sutton: Reining in on Runaway RICO, 42 U. PrrT. L. REv. 131 (1980); Note,
Statutory Interpretation-Racketeer Inftuenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO) Applies Only to
"Legitimate" Enterprises: United States v. Sutton, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 685 (1980); Note, The Rack-
eteer Inj~uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analsis of the Confusion in its Application and a
Proposalfor Refonn, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1980).
40 In United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1351
(1981), a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that "enterprise" encompasses "only an association
having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations di-
rected toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the
commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity."' Id at
1372. The court distinguished its holding from the panel decision in United States v. Sutton,
605 F.2d 290, by pointing out that its decision did not rest "on the word 'legitimate' but
rather on the need for a discrete economic association existing separately from the racketeer-
ing activity." 626 F.2d at 1372. The definition of "enterprise" in Anderson appears to encom-
pass wholly illegitimate enterprises if they meet the requirements quoted above. See, e.g.,
Tarlow, supra note 39, at 198; Comment, RICO. Conjfision in the Circuits in Interpreting "Enter-
pre", 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 120 (1981).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 903; United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d at
1054 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (Judge Merritt had authored the panel decision rejected by the
Sixth Circuit sitting en banc); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1362-72; United States
v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 265-66; United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 573 (Ely, J., dissenting);
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Bradley, supra note
39, at 854; Tarlow, supra note 39, at 197-98; Note, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv., supra note 39, at 146;
Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REv., supra note 39, at 701; Note, 33 VAND. L. REV., supra note 39, at
462, 467, 469.
42 632 F.2d at 903.
43 Id
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nected with this "enterprise." '44 "The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of
racketeering;' it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activ-
ity in which it engages."'45
The confusion over the need to establish the existence of an "enter-
prise" separate from the occurrence of the acts which constitute the
"pattern of racketeering activity" stems in part from the failure of courts
to indicate clearly which entity is the "enterprise" significant for the
RICO prosecution.46 The decision in Turkette should eliminate some of
the confusion over the proof necessary to establish an "enterprise" and
the type of "enterprise" relevant to a RICO charge. The Court stated
that the existence of an "enterprise" is "proved by evidence of an ongo-
ing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit. '47 This description restricts the
definition in RICO section 1961(4) and represents a departure from the
vague standards previously applied by lower courts.48
The Supreme Court's restriction of the term "enterprise" answers
44 101 S. Ct. at 2529. The prosecution had not disputed this point. Id at 2529 n.5.
45 Id at 2528-29.
46 For example, in United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, the court did not discuss what
evidence established that the defendants constituted an "enterprise." In the statement of
findings, however, the court did note facts that indicated that the defendants were "associated
in fact" and had participated in the three criminal acts together. Id at 301-02. Thus, the
court may merely have failed to state that since the defendants were "associated in fact," they
were an "enterprise" as required by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The court, however, may
have been confused as to which entity was the "enterprise." See 609 F.2d at 305. There seems
to have been early confusion over how the broad definition of "enterprise" related to the
RICO concern with infiltration of legitimate business. See id; United States v. Sutton, 642
F.2d at 1005, 1010-11, 1015.
47 This description of the evidence necessary to prove the existence of an "enterprise" does
not appear to be limited to the case before the Court. Since the Court had, however, quali-
fied a preceding statement concerning the definition of "enterprise," one could argue that the
subsequent statement, quoted in the text, was also limited to Turkelie. The complete passage
reads:
In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the exist-
ence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enter-
prise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activ-
ity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1). The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or infor-
mal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The
latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by
the participants in the enterprise.
101 S. Ct. at 2528.
48 See note 46 supra. In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 898, the court described an
"association in fact" enterprise as "an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret crimi-
nal network." Id But the court also used language very similar to that found in the Supreme
Court's description in Turketle: "[i]n defining 'enterprise,' Congress made clear that the stat-
ute extended beyond conventional business organizations to reach 'any. . .group of individ-
uals' whose association, however loose or informal, furnishes a vehicle for the commission of
two or more predicate crimes." Id See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
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critics who claimed that the inclusion of wholly illegitimate organiza-
tions would permit prosecutorial abuse in the application of RICO.49
The First Circuit expressed concern in its Turkette decision that RICO
would be used against individuals who had merely committed two gam-
bling or prostitution offenses within ten years.50 Such violations would
be acts of "racketeering activity" sufficient for RICO prosecution if they
were prohibited by state law.5 1 RICO was designed for use against
more than just isolated criminal acts.52 The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Report on RICO explained that "[t]he target of title IX is . . .not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing
activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship
which combines to produce a pattern.153 In Turkette, the Supreme
Court limited the application of RICO to "ongoing organizations"
whose "various associates function as a continuing unit."5 4 This defini-
tion of "enterprise" reduces the potential for abuse in the application of
RICO by requiring continuity in the "enterprise" element. 55 This ap-
proach allows RICO to be used against individuals who engage in or-
ganized criminal activity. If the Court had required continuity in the
"pattern" element as some courts and commentators have suggested, 56
49 United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 902, 903-04; United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at
266; Comment, 27 DEPAUL L. REv., supra note 38, at 100-01; Comment, 50 U. CIN. L. RE,.,
supra note 40, at 132; Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REv., supra note 39, at 704; Note, 33 VAND. L.
REV., supra note 39, at 446-47. Although this objection was related to the misconception that
the "enterprise" element would be eliminated if the broad interpretation were accepted, these
critics would have probably made the same objection if the "enterprise" element, although
established separately from the "pattern of racketeering activity," could have consisted
merely of individuals "associated in fact" for conducting criminal activity.
50 632 F.2d at 902, 903-04. See also United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 266.
51 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). See note 14supra.
52 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969).
53 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969).
54 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
55 The Court did not modify the definition of "pattern" in Turkelle. See 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
See also note 15 supra. Some courts and commentators had suggested that continuity be in-
cluded in the "pattern" element. See note 56 infa.
56 United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v.
Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Tarlow, supra note 39, at 213-20; Note, 33
VAND. L. REV., supra note 39, at 477. In United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614, the
court viewed the "pattern" element in RICO "as including a requirement that the racketeer-
ing acts must have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive
so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts." Id. The language
of the Senate Report quoted in the text accompanying note 53 supra does offer some grounds
for such a conclusion. In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899 n.23, the court rejected the
suggestions of the district courts in United States v. Stofsky and United States v. White,
recognizing that RICO "does require a type of relatedness: the two or more predicate crimes
must be related to the affairs of the enterprise but need not otherwise be related to each
other." I4 This is the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Turkelle. See note 47 &
accompanying text supra.
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RICO would have been unnecessarily limited to those criminal enter-
prises that confine their activities to related types of crimes. As the. Fifth
Circuit noted in United States z. Elliott,57 although RICO is not aimed at
sporadic activity, there is no reason that it should not be applied to en-
terprises involved in diversified criminal activity.58
The limitation of "enterprise" to organizations that have engaged
in ongoing criminal activity does not prevent the application of RICO
to persons other than members of organized crime groups such as the
Mafia. Although members of such groups had been the original target
of the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress decided upon a broader
attack.5 9 "Organized crime" is used in RICO in its generic sense, refer-
ring to any organized criminal activity.60 Since Congress was aware
that RICO would also reach individuals not associated with organized
crime groups such as the Mafia, 61 criticism of RICO prosecutions of
small, informally organized groups which have committed only a few
criminal acts is not justified if the acts and the organization of such
groups meet the RICO requirements. 62 The use of RICO against such
groups is not prosecutorial abuse.
Opponents of the broad interpretation of "enterprise" have also ar-
gued that since adequate remedies already exist for persons who partici-
pate in wholly criminal organizations, it is not necessary to extend the
application of RICO to such organizations. 63 In Turkette, the First Cir-
cuit noted that Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act covered
57 571 F.2d at 899.
58 Id
59 116 CONG. REc. 18939-40, 35344 (1970).
60 See id at 35344; McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens
Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 61 (1970). The drafters of RICO realized that it
would be impossible to limit the statute to organized crime groups like the Mafia, and even if
such a restriction could be drafted, it would encounter constitutional problems. 116 CONG.
REC. 18940, 35343-44 (1970). (An amendment offered in the House to limit RICO to organ-
ized criminals of Italian ancestry was rejected. Id at 35346).
61 116 CONG. REc. 18940 (1970); Atkinson, supra note 39, at 3.
62 Commentators have offered several cases as examples of prosecutorial abuse in the ap-
plication of RICO to small enterprises. Cases criticized included: United States v. Aleman,
609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Weatherspoon,
581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (owner and operator of beauty college used mails in scheme to
defraud the Veteran's Administration of payments for students not entrolled in the school);
United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (the defendant and two associates
planned and participated in several rigged card games). See also Note, United States v. Sutton:
The Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, The Federal Racketeering Enterprise Statute, 28 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 629 (1979); Note, 33 VAND. L. REV., supra note 39, at 461-62, 476-77. (These critics
were assuming that RICO applied only to legitimate enterprises when they made these
objections).
63 United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 905-06; Comment, 27 DEPAuL L. REV., sura
note 39, at 103; Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REv., supra note 39, at 701; Note, 33 VAND. L. REv.,
supra note 39, at 466.
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one type of criminal enterprise-the illegal gambling business.4 Title
VIII makes it unlawful to "condtict, manage, supervise, direct, or own
all or part" of a gambling business involving five or more persons. 65 The
court of appeals reasoned that Congress could not have intended that
Title IX would apply to illegitimate enterprises such as illegal gambling
businesses, for this would permit circumvention of the Title VIII five-
person requirement. 66 The Supreme Court did not address this issue in
Turkette. The First Circuit, however, misinterpreted the RICO require-
ments. Participation in a gambling business prohibited by Title VIII
does qualify as "racketeering activity" under RICO section
1961(1)(B).67 Gambling activity in violation of Title VIII is, however,
subject to RICO prosecution only if the gambling "enterprise" is indict-
able under Title VIII.68 Operation of a gambling business could serve
as one of the predicate acts required for RICO only if the requirements
of Title VIII were met. 69 RICO does not circumvent the provisions of
other federal statutes such as Title VIII. RICO prohibits, instead, the
separate offense of engaging in a pattern of gambling or other "racke-
teering activity." 70 Although RICO section 1961 (1) (A) allows for prose-
cution of state gambling law violations and these laws may not require
five persons, this use of RICO would have no effect on the applicability
of Title VIII. The provisions of Title VIII have no import for the issue
of whether illegitimate organizations are within the scope of Title IX.
Congress enacted RICO and the other provisions of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 because existing remedies were inadequate.71
The Supreme Court was aware that RICO represented a new approach
to combating organized criminal activity when it rejected the First Cir-
cuit's narrow interpretation of "enterprise. '72
IV. INTERPRETING RICO: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The role of legislative history in the interpretation of RICO has
64 632 F.2d at 902.
65 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)Qi) (1976).
66 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) requires only a single individual. See note 13 & accompanying text
supra.
67 See note 14 supra.
68 This statement is limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), which refers only to acts indictable
under federal laws. See note 14 supra.
69 Id
70 Although RICO does not make illegal any act which was previously legal, it does pro-
vide for punishment in addition to that imposed for the individual predicate crimes. See
Atkinson, supra note 39, at 8.
71 See 116 CONG. Rzc. 591, 18939 (1970); 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969). These passages
refer specifically to the inadequacy of existing remedies in preventing organized crime from
infiltrating legitimate businesses. See also Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 39, at 365.
72 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2530.
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been a central issue in the debate over the proper scope of "enter-
prise."' 73 The initial decision concerning the presence or absence of am-
biguity in the statutory language determines a court's position on the
significance of expressions of legislative intent. 74 A general rule of statu-
tory interpretation provides that if a statute's language is unambiguous,
the court must accept the literal meaning of the language unless it is
clearly contrary to legislative intent or leads to absurd results. 75
The definition of "enterprise" in section 1961(4) reads: " 'enter-
prise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity. ' 76 The Supreme Court recognized in
Turkette that the language of section 1961(4) clearly permits both legiti-
mate and illegitimate enterprises. 77 The definition of "enterprise" con-
tains no restriction on the purpose of the organization. As the Court
noted, Congress could have easily limited the application of "enterprise"
by inserting "legitimate" into the definition, 78 but neither the word "le-
gitimate" nor "illegitimate," nor terms with similar meanings, appears
in any of the sections of RICO.
All courts which have considered the scope of RICO's "enterprise"
requirement have examined the statute's legislative history. 79 There is
no dispute that the primary purpose of Title IX was to combat the infil-
tration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.80 This goal is ex-
73 See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d at 1003-05, 1009-10; Id at 1054 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1368-71; United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
at 568-69; Id at 573-74 (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106-07; Id at
107-11 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Note, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW., supra note 39, at 792-
94.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2527-28, 2531-34; United States v.
Turkette, 632 F.2d at 898-903; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106; Id at 107-08 (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
75 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases,
436 U.S. 632, 643 (1978)); 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04
(4th ed. 1973).
76 The definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 differ in whether they are introduced with the term
"means" or "includes." Those definitions which begin with "includes" appear to be merely
illustrative and not exhaustive lists.
77 101 S. Ct. at 2527. "On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does
legitimate ones." Id
78 Id at 2527. One could counter with the argument that since Congress intended for the
statute to reach only legitimate businesses, there was no need to qualify "enterprise." See note
103 infra. Although the concern with legitimate enterprises is obvious in the legislative his-
tory, see note 80 infra, this purpose is not clear in the language of the statute.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 899-903; United States v. Anderson, 626
F.2d at 1368-69; United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d at 303; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d
at 106. Se also Comment, 27 D8PAUL L. REv., supra note 39, at 96; Comment, 124 U. PA. L.
REv., supra note 39, at 204-06.
80 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2532; United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d at 1005;
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pressed clearly in the reports of the hearings and debates on RICO and
the other provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act.81 Language
in an earlier Supreme Court opinion had also indicated that the pri-
mary aim of Title IX was to protect legitimate enterprises.82 The real
dispute over the significance of the legislative history of RICO is
whether the prevention of further infiltration of legitimate businesses by
organized crime was the sole objective of Title IX, or merely one of the
statute's purposes. 83
The First Circuit concluded in Turkette that because the definition
of "enterprise" did not indicate whether it included illegitimate organi-
zations, the language of the definition was ambiguous.84 The Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the majority of the courts of appeals that
the language of Section 1961(4) was clear and broad,8 5 and the Court
held that wholly illegitimate enterprises were included within "enter-
prise" in RICO.8 6
If one reads the definition of "enterprise" together with the legisla-
tive history of RICO, it is possible to conclude that the language of sec-
tion 1961(4) is unclear, since "enterprise" is not confined to the
"legitimate enterprises" which were clearly Congress' primary concern
in enacting RICO. The First Circuit committed a logical error, how-
ever, when it concluded from the legislative history that "enterprise"
must be limited to legitimate businesses. 87 The Supreme Court recog-
nized correctly in Turkette that, although it was clear from the legislative
history that RICO was aimed at preventing the infiltration of legitimate
businesses, it did not necessarily follow that this was the statute's sole
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 900; United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1371-72;
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 569; Atkinson, supra note 39, at 9; Note, Coverage and
Application of the Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970" The Anti-Racketeering Statute in Operation, 53
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 498, 499-500 (1976); Note, 28 CLEv. ST. L. Rav., supra note 62, at 644-45.
81 116CONG. REc. 591,592,601, 18939, 18940, 18941 (1970); 115 CONG. REc. 9567, 9568
(1969).
82 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 787 n.19 (1975). "Title IX, codified in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, seeks to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business operations affect-
ing interstate commerce by individuals who have-obtained investment capital from a pattern
of racketeering activity." Id
83 Courts and commentators who have viewed the prevention of the infiltration of organ-
ized crime as the sole goal have concluded that "enterprise" must be confined to legitimate
organizations. See notes 86-87 infra. Those who have realized that the protection of legiti-
mate businesses was only the major purpose, however, have adopted the broader definition.
See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 569; United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064,
1073 (5th Cir. 1977); Note, 66 CORNELL L. REv., supra note 39, at 189; Note, 49 GEo. WASH.
L. R.v. supra note 39, at 138-39.
84 632 F.2d at 899.
85 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
86 Id at 2533-34.
87 Id at 2532. See also Note, 66 CORNELL L. REv., supra note 39, at 189.
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purpose.88 There was evidence that Congress was concerned with more
than just the protection of legitimate businesses. 89
The statement of findings prefacing the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 stated:
The Congress finds [that] . ..(2) organized crime derives a major portion
of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndi-
cated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the im-
portation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and
other forms of social exploitation. . . and (5) organized crime continues to
grow. . . because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government
are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 90
The findings further stated that it was the purpose of Congress in enact-
ing the Organized Crime Control Act "to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime."91 In Turkette, the
Supreme Court recognized that if the term "enterprise" in RICO were
limited to legitimate enterprises, a number of the targets mentioned in
section (2) of the statement of findings (quoted above) would not be
within the reach of the Act. 92 "[L]oan sharking, the theft and fencing of
property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dan-
gerous drugs" 93 would be "immune from prosecution under RICO so
long as the association did not deviate from the criminal path. ' 94 Since
no other title of the Act addresses these activities, crimes which Congress
had indicated it wanted to reach would not be within the scope of the
Act. 95
Additional support for the inclusion of illegitimate associations
within the meaning of "enterprise" in RICO is found in the fact that it
would be impossible to apply a legitimate-illegitimate distinction with-
out absurd results.96 For example, consider a cigarette distributor who
88 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2532.
89 See 116 CONG. REc. 591, 844, 18940, 35328 (1970).
90 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1 (1970), quoted in United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2531.
91 Id (emphasis added).
92 101 S. Ct. at 2532.
93 See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
94 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2532.
95 Turkette argued in his brief to the Supreme Court that the activities listed in (2) of the
Statement of Findings were covered by Title X which provides for the sentencing of special
offenders. Brief for Respondent at 11-12, United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524. But
Title X applies only to dangerous special offenders who have served previous prison sentences
or meet other specific standards. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). The traditional remedy of
imprisoning individual members of organized crime groups has been inadequate. Blakey &
Goldstock, supra note 39, at 365. See also notes 63 & 71 supra.
96 See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
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ran a wholly legitimate business which affected interstate commerce. If
this distributor began selling contraband cigarettes in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2341-46, defined as "racketeering activity" in RICO section
1961(1)(B),97 then persons associated with or employed by the mainly
legitimate cigarette distribution business would constitute an "enter-
prise" and would be subject to prosecution under RICO.98 If the dis-
tributor ceased selling non-contraband cigarettes, the business would
become a wholly illegitimate enterprise. If RICO were limited to enter-
prises engaging in some legitimate activities, then RICO would not ap-
ply to persons associated with the cigarette distribution business once
the business had become wholly illegitimate. This example illustrates
the absurd outcome which would be possible if RICO were limited to
businesses that engage in legitimate activities. As a business shifted from
legitimate to totally illegitimate activities, it would move out of the
reach of RICO. One guide for determining the scope of statutory lan-
guage is that "absurd results are to be avoided." 99 In rejecting the con-
tention of the First Circuit that a broad application of RICO would
produce absurd or surprising results, 1°° the Supreme Court responded in
Turkette that, "[o]n the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enter-.
prise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous
position."' 0
It is probable that few, if any, members of Congress contemplated
that RICO could be applied to criminal enterprises. 10 2 Associations
whose sole purpose is to commit illegal acts do, however, fit within the
description of "enterprise" given in RICO section 1961(4), and section
1962(c) allows for prosecution of persons who participate or associate
with such an enterprise. Although Congress does not appear to have
considered this application of RICO, it does not necessarily follow, as
some courts and commentators have concluded, 0 3 that RICO should
not be applied to criminal organizations. The relevant issue is not
whether Congress intended such an application of the statute, but rather
97 See note 14 supra. Sections 2421-24 were added to § 1961(1)(B) in 1978. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (1981 pocket part).
98 These persons could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d). See also note 7
.upra .
99 See note 75 & accompanying text sura.
100 See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 899, 905-06.
101 101 S. Ct. at 2531.
102 Critics of the broad interpretation of "enterprise" have also made this claim. See, e.g.,
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 108 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-59 n.8 (D. Conn. 1975).
103 See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 268; United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at
58; Comment, 27 DEPAuL L. REV., supra note 39, at 98-99; Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REV., supra
note 39, at 703; Note, 33 VAND. L. RaV., supra note 39, at 465. But see United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1371.
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whether this use of RICO violates congressional intent. There is clear
evidence that some members of Congress do approve of the inclusion of
wholly illegitimate enterprises within the scope of RICO. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary expressed its approval of the broad inter-
pretation of "enterprise" in its Report on the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1977.104 The Report mentioned that four circuits had construed
"enterprise" broadly so as to include wholly illegitimate organiza-
tions. 10 5 After noting that the three-judge panel decision in UnitedStates
v. Sutton was the only contrary opinion,10 6 the Report stated "[t]he Com-
mittee endorses the majority view. . . . The Committee intends that
the same broad interpretation be given the term 'enterprise' in this
bill." 0 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Turkette represents the best ap-
proach to the interpretation of RICO. The broad reading of "enter-
prise" to include wholly illegitimate associations within the purview of
RICO's prohibitions permits the statute to serve as an effective tool in
combating organized criminal activity. The broad language of Title IX,
the overall purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, and
the Senate Judiciary Committee's recent expressions of approval sup-
port the Supreme Court's holding.
V. INTERPRETING RICO: THE APPLICABILITY OF
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Rules of construction are aids for the interpretation of ambiguous
statutory language. 108 In Turkette, the First Circuit agreed with a
number of judges and commentators that the language of RICO section
1961(4) was unclear, which made it necessary to apply rules of statutory
construction to determine the proper scope of "enterprise." 10 9 The
Supreme Court disagreed, however, since it found the definition of "en-
terprise" unambiguous. 110 Even if the high Court had not found the
104 S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 803 (1980). See also S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 777 (1977).
105 The report mentions United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564; United States v. Swiderski,
593 F.2d 1246; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104; United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472
(5th Cir. 1976). S. REP. No. 553, supra note 104, at 803.
106 S. REP. No. 553, supra note 104, at 803.
107 Id
108 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2528 (citing Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
446 U.S. 578, 588 (1979)).
109 632 F.2d at 899, 905; United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1365-66; United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Tarlow, supra note 39, at 195-98;
Comment, 27 DEPAUL L. REV., supra note 39, at 95-96; Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REv., supra note
39, at 701.
110 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2527-28.
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meaning of "enterprise" plain, however, it had other grounds for ob-
jecting to the First Circuit's application *of construction aids.
The rule of Siusdem generi has been used frequently by courts inter-
preting "enterprise" in RICO."' This rule provides that where general
words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are
read as being limited to items similar to those specifically enumer-
ated.112 The First Circuit applied this rule in Trkette and concluded
that since each of the enterprises specifically enumerated in the first part
of the definition of "enterprise" was a legitimate organization, the
phrase "any. . . group of individuals associated in fact" in the second
part of the definition must also be limited to legitimate enterprises. 13 A
number of judges and commentators had applied the rule with similar
results. 114 The Supreme Court recognized that the First Circuit had
erred in its application of the rule. 115 The specifically enumerated en-
terprises in the first half of the definition-individuals, partnerships, cor-
porations, associations, or other legal entities-could be either legitimate
or illegitimate entities.' 16 The two parts of section 1961(4) describe two
different types of enterprises: those which are recognized as legal entities
and those which are not." 17 Ejusdem generis was not applicable to the
definition of "enterprise" in RICO section 1961(4).
The First Circuit also applied the principle of lenity in Turkette as
an aid in determining the proper scope of "enterprise." ' 18 This "an-
cient" rule of statutory construction provides that if there is ambiguity
in a penal statute, the statute should be strictly construed against the
prosecuting party and in favor of the defendant. 119 Unlike most penal
statutes, however, Title IX contains a "liberal construction" clause
which says that provisions included in the title "shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purpose."' 20 The Supreme Court
agreed with the majority of the courts of appeal that RICO's liberal
11 See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 899; United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at
1366; United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
112 2A C. SANDS, suzpra note 75, § 47.17.
113 632 F.2d at 899.
114 See note 111 tufra.
115 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2528.
116 Id
117 Id
118 632 F.2d at 905. See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1370. C. SANDS, sufra
note 75, at § 59.03 uses "strict construction" to refer to this same principle.
119 Id
120 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a) (1970). It is unusual for a penal statute to contain such a
clause. See Note, 66 CORNELL L. REv., s fra note 39, at 168. The court of appeals concluded
in Turkette that the liberal construction clause applied only to the civil remedies and not to the
criminal sanctions in Title IX. 632 F.2d at 905. Traditional rules for penal and remedial
statutes, however, may no longer be applicable. See 3 C. SANDS, szira note 75, at § 60.04.
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construction clause renders the principle of lenity inapplicable. 121
VI. THE SCOPE OF RICO AFTER TURKETTE
Opponents of the broad interpretation of "enterprise" have been
concerned that the inclusion of wholly criminal associations in RICO
would allow for prosecutorial abuse in the application of the statute. 122
Although the Supreme Court restricted "enterprise" in Turkette to ongo-
ing organizations,123 additional limitations may be needed to prevent
abuse.
There has been concern that RICO could be used to prosecute per-
sons only remotely associated with a criminal enterprise.124 Some com-
mentators have suggested that since the RICO penalties are so severe, a
scienter requirement should be included in RICO to prevent unjust ap-
plication of the statute. 25 A scienter requirement would make it neces-
sary to establish that a person prosecuted as a member of an
"association-in-fact" enterprise was aware that he was participating in
an organization which was engaging in racketeering activities. 126 If an
explicit scienter standard is needed, it should not be too stringent. One
commentator has proposed a requirement that all members in a crimi-
nal enterprise know each other and be aware of all the types of racke-
teering activity in which the members engaged.' 27 This requirement
would thwart RICO's goal of reaching more than just the central figures
in large criminal organizations. 128 Recent prosecutions under RICO in-
dicate that an explicit scienter requirement may not be needed, how-
ever. In cases involving large numbers of defendants, RICO
prosecutions have succeeded only against the principal participants. 129
In Turkette, only the leader of the thirteen-member criminal enterprise
was convicted on the RICO count. 30 The criminal enterprise in United
121 United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2531. The Court did not find it necessary,
however, to base its conclusion on the presence of the liberal construction clause. Id Since
the language of the statute was plain, and Congress had not clearly rejected the literal inter-
pretation of the language, there was no need for the Court to rely on rules of construction. Id
122 See notes 49-50 & accompanying text sufra.
123 See note 47 & accompanying text sufira.
124 See Atkinson, sfupra note 39, at 6; Bradley, sura note 39, at 838; Note, 28 CLEV. ST. L.
REV., supra note 62, at 652; Note, 33 VAND. L. Rav., supra note 39, at 46-47.
125 See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 4-5; Tarlow, supra note 39, at 235-36; Note, 49 GEo.
WASH. L. REv., supra note 39, at 139-42.
126 Id Commentators disagree, however, on how specific a member's knowledge of the
other members and activities of the enterprise should be. See i
127 Note, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 39, at 139-42.
128 See notes 59 and 61 & accompanying text sufra.
129 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524; United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880.
130 632 F.2d at 898 n.4.
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States v. Elliott included forty-three persons involved in twenty-five crim-
inal acts.13' Thirty-seven members of the enterprise were unindicted co-
conspirators.1 32 Five of the six members indicted on the RICO counts
were convicted. 3 3 Since only major participants have been convicted in
RICO cases involving large criminal enterprises, failure to apply the
statute to the extent Congress intended may be a more significant prob-
lem than abuse in the application of the statute.
Modification of other RICO elements may be necessary to assure
that the statute is used only against organized criminal activity. One
court has recommended the restriction of "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" to two acts which occur as part of different criminal episodes. 13
Since there are no obvious cases of abuse in the application of RICO
either to individuals unaware of the activities of the "enterprise" with
which they were associated or to enterprises committing two acts during
a single criminal episode, no immediate modifications of RICO appear
necessary.
CONCLUSION
In Turkette, the Supreme Court both broadened and narrowed the
scope of the term "enterprise" and hence changed the extent of RICO's
applicability. The Court's endorsement of the inclusion of wholly ille-
gitimate enterprises within the purview of RICO allows the statute to
serve its purpose of combating organized crime. The, definition of "en-
terprise" clearly permits both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.
Nothing in the legislative history of RICO prohibits this broad interpre-
tation. The Supreme Court's description of an "enterprise" as an
"ongoing organization" in which "the various associates function as a
continuing unit" prevents the misapplication of the statute without in-
terfering with its effectiveness as a tool against organized criminal activ-
ity. Thus, Turkette answers major questions about the applicability of
RICO and allows for the proper application of the statute.
JAN NEUENSCHWANDER
131 571 F.2d at 884, 895.
132 id at 895.
133 Id at 911.
134 See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 11-12; Tarlow, sufpra note 39, at 216-19. ee also United
States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 57-58.
